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Administrative Structures for Accountability 
in Colonial Nigeria: A Review of their Impact 
on Fiscal Prudence, 1950–1960
Adetunji Ojo Ogunyemi*
This study presents an aspect of the history of Nigeria’s public finance during the colonial 
period showing how public institutions created for the administrations of the country’s 
finances either helped to curtail or failed to arrest corrupt practices from 1950–1960. 
The study argues that the issue of graft in government and by public officials which is 
prevalent in contemporary Nigeria was not a rarity in the colonial period and that at 
least, on the problems of theft of public revenues and the failure to observe the rules of 
accountability in public expenditure matters, cases of indictment of colonial officials 
were rife in the decolonisation period. The study therefore discusses how the problems of 
corruption and the refusal to observe the due processes of financial accountability were 
managed by the institutions established to ensure that they were either obliterated or 
reduced to the barest minimum in colonial Nigeria. The study concludes that although 
those institutions succeeded in reporting many cases and acts of corruption including 
even miscellaneous but nonetheless improper dealings with Nigerian finances, they 
failed either to prevent them or took very lame steps to ensure that indicted officials were 
sanctioned appropriately for such acts.
[Financial Administration; Accountability; Fiscal Prudence; Colonial Nigeria; 
20th Century]
Introduction
The fiscal administration of Nigeria in the colonial period was of great im-
portance both to the consolidation of the alien rule and to the integration 
of the country into the orbit of British imperial economy. Public finance 
was at the very heart of colonial rule. It attracted the greatest attention 
of British administrators in their respective colonies. Hence, structures 
were built, laws were made, and institutions formed, together with their 
* Department of History, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile Ife, Nigeria; e-mail: mo-
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administrative procedures, to aid the efficient administration of colonial 
finance. The ultimate goal being first, to avoid the possibility of Nigeria 
depending indefinitely on British treasury for sustenance and second, to 
ensure that colonial rule in Nigeria was financially beneficial to the British 
government and its investing public.
Thus, issues of revenue generation as well as expenditure planning and 
disbursement which required utmost accountability from public officials 
were supported with clearly defined administrative structures and backed 
by institutional framework for ensuring prudence and discouraging cor-
ruption. There were in that regard, four major administrative structures 
built more along the lines of checks and balances than for separation of 
powers, in the fashion advocated by Baron de Montesquieu.1 These four 
structures were the offices of the: (i) Governor-General (ii) Financial 
Secretary (iii) Accountant-General and (iv) the Director of Audit. All 
these offices belonged to the executive arm of government and, as such, 
little consideration was given to the Nigerian Legislative Council in fiscal 
matters except at the tail-end of the decolonisation period (1954–1960) 
when, beginning in the 1958/59 fiscal year, and as a result of some 
constitutional amendments, Nigerian indigenous political elite had 
conceded to them through the Legislative Council, some powers over 
the federal budget and fiscal policy.2 It is important to stress here that 
even as far back as the proclamation of the Nigerian Letters Patent 1946, 
otherwise called the Arthur Richards Constitution, colonial authorities 
in England had ensured that money bills and other matters connected 
with taxation and budgeting were made the exclusive preserve of the 
British Monarch, his Privy Council and their representatives in Nigeria.3 
For instance, the 1946 Arthur Richards’ Constitution while on the one 
hand conferred great powers over revenue and budgeting matters on 
the Governor, it, on the other hand, stipulated with respect to the same 
1 Baron de Montesquieu, the eighteenth-century French philosopher was famous for 
popularising the idea of iron-cast separation of powers between the three arms of 
government of legislature, executive and the judiciary. See C. MONTESQUIEU, Selec-
tion from The Spirit of the Laws (1746), in: The Political Theory of Montesquieu, edited 
with an introduction by M. RICHTER, Cambridge 1977.
2 This was contained in the amended version of the Constitution of Nigeria (Order in 
Council), 1954, (as amended, 1958) section 154, in which the Nigerian legislature, the 
House of Representatives, was conferred with the powers of initiating and approving 
every expenditure of government.
3 See GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA, Constitution (Nigeria Letters Patent) (Arthur Richards 
Constitution), Lagos 1946, section 22.
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issues, a delimitation of the powers of the Nigerian Legislative Council. It 
did this in the following words: “[…] the Council shall not proceed upon any 
Bill, amendment, motion or petition which, in the opinion of the Governor or in that 
of presiding member, would dispose of or charge any public revenue or public funds 
of Nigeria, or revoke or alter any disposition thereof or charge thereon, or impose, 
alter or repeal any rate, tax or duty.”4
In other words, the above provision clearly put beyond the Legislative 
Council, any serious decision concerning public revenue. It limited its role 
only to giving advice to the Governor on matters of public finance. In fact, 
the whole issues of budgeting and the passage of the annual appropria-
tion Act, which ordinarily should have been domiciled in the Nigerian 
Legislative Council in Lagos were the colonial authorities desirous of 
making themselves accountable to Nigerians, was actually directed to 
be forwarded to Britain through the Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
The relevant provision of the Arthur Richards’ Constitution in this regard 
stated: “The Governor shall forward to Us, from year to year through a secretary 
of state, the annual book of returns commonly called the Blue Book, relating to 
revenue and expenditure, public works, legislation, civil establishments, pensions, 
populations, schools, course of exchange, imports and exports, agricultural produce, 
manufactures and other matters in the said Blue Book, more particularly specified 
with reference to the state and condition of Nigeria.”5
A plethora of works exist about colonial administration in Nigeria. 
But the works weigh more in favour of the description and analysis of 
the political history of the period than they do on economic or financial 
administration.6 Yet in 1940, just a year into the Second World War, Pim 
brought to the fore, a new and refreshing financial dimension to the 
historiography of colonial Africa when he published his The Financial 
and Economic History of the African Tropical Territories.7 The book is one of 
the pioneering efforts in the financial history of African states. It reveals 
the nature and character of Africa’s financial relations with its European 
metropolitan states and the pattern of production which such nature 
and character brought to bear on the economy of tropical African 
countries. Eight years after, in 1948 Margery Perham edited a volume, 
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., section 25.
6 Most of the works before 1960 were concerned for instance, with an analysis of 
colonial administration and the indirect rule system. See for example J. WHITE, Central 
Administation in Nigeria, 1914–1948, Dublin 1981.
7 A. PIM, The Financial and Economic History of the African Tropical Territories, London 1940.
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Mining,  Commerce and Finance in Nigeria,8 which makes a direct and specific 
treatment of Nigeria’s extractive industries – coal, tin, etc. It also offers 
a discussion of how the growth in commercial activities in Nigeria was 
guided and enhanced by European financial institutions and their invest-
ing public. The two works of Pim and Perham however fail to show or 
discuss the significance of colonial administrative structures to the birth 
and regulation of colonial finance.
It was not until 1956 that Arthur Hazzlewood published his highly 
detailed The Finances of Nigerian Federation9 that a closer look and analysis 
of the structure of fiscal relations and the distribution of tax powers 
between the federating parts of the Nigerian federation was had. Nigeria 
had, by 1954, been formally proclaimed a federation of regions and the 
Lyttleton constitution which contained the proclamation had clearly 
stipulated the boundaries and character of the revenue powers of the 
federating parts. Hazzlewood’s work offers a fascinating discussion of 
this fiscal relationship and the size of the Nigerian fiscal system vis-à-vis 
the country’s developmental needs. Still, a direct analysis of the role and 
powers of the regulatory authorities such as the offices of the financial 
secretary and the Accountant-General of the Federation is not made in 
the work. Even works that were published, few years after independence 
on the subject of Nigeria’s finances such as those of Pius Okigbo’s Nigerian 
Public Finance,10 and Adebayo Adedeji’s Nigerian Federal Finances: Its Develop-
ment Problem and Prospects,11 though show extensively and illuminate the 
broad issues of public finance such as taxation and sharing of tax powers 
among Nigeria’s component parts revealing in the process, a discussion of 
the topical issue of public debt, and the criteria for the determination of 
revenue allocation formulae, (especially Adedeji’s Nigerian Federal Finance) 
from 1954–1965 but a discussion of the administrative and institutional 
bodies that regulated those fiscal relations escaped the attention of the 
authors.
However, in 1979, Adebayo Lawal made a major contribution to 
the financial history of Nigeria through his A History of the Financial 
Administration of Nigeria, 1900–1945.12 Lawal’s work which is actually his 
8 M. PERHAM, Mining, Commerce and Finance in Nigeria, London 1948.
9 A. HAZZLEWOOD The Finances of Nigerian Federation, London 1956.
10 P. OKIGBO, Nigerian Public Finance, London 1965.
11 A. ADEDEJI, Nigerian Federal Finances: Its Development Problem and Prospects, London 1969.
12 A. A. LAWAL, A History of the Financial Administration of Nigeria, 1900–1945, University 
of Lagos 1979, Ph.D. Thesis.
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Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of Lagos in 1979 on the subject 
lays bare the character of colonial finance in Nigeria and shows the role 
of British Colonial Officials particular the Governor-General and his 
Lieutenant – Governors in the preparation, legitimation and implemen-
tation of colonial fiscal policies. But Lawal’s contributions only covers 
the period in which Nigeria was effectively, a unitary state. The scope 
of the work which terminates in 1945 did not even cover the time in 
which Nigerian colonial authorities experimented with a quasi-federal 
arrangement. Under the 1946 Arthur Richards’ constitution, the fore 
runner to the 1954 Oliver Lyttleton constitution that embodied Nigeria’s 
first federal law and its counterpart principle of fiscal federalism. This 
present study which begins in the very year of negotiation for Nigeria’s 
federal structure in 1950 completes the trajectory of discussions on 
Nigeria’s financial administration in the colonial period. It discusses the 
role, functions and powers of federal administrative officials who had the 
onerous responsibility of managing Nigeria’s resources prudently and 
who ought to ensure fiscal accountability in so doing. The officials were 
not expected to work at their own whims and caprices but within clearly 
set prudential guidelines encoded both in the relevant constitution and 
laws guiding colonial finance and the administrative practices common 
to all British dependencies. By prudential guidelines it is meant here, 
the regulations set both by law and conventions by which all corrupt 
and non-accountable acts were to be avoided, detected and brought to 
justice. The guidelines were supposed to be obeyed by all civil and public 
officials because they defined the boundaries of administrative powers 
and discretion over public resources. They were in short, the canon of 
fiscal accountability in colonial Nigeria.
Prudential Guidelines for Nigeria’s Colonial Finance
The most important of these guidelines and which are of direct relevance 
to our purposes here are: (i) that all expenditure and revenue operations 
of government should be stipulated and contained in one “Blue Book” 
(annual budget) prepared and submitted by the Governor of Nigeria to 
the British Parliament for its concurrence and assent in every fiscal year;13 
(ii) that no moneys should be spent on any matter of state howsoever rea-
sonable without it been first contained in an approved budget;14 (iii) that 
13 See Nigeria Constitution (Order in Council), Lagos 1954, section 154.
14 Ibid.
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disbursement of funds as approved in the budget should only be by means 
of warrant, duly issued either by the Financial secretary or the Governor;15 
(iv) that full statements of government financial transactions detailing 
all receipts and expenditure should be prepared on a yearly basis by the 
Accountant-General of the Federation who should transmit the same to 
the Director of Federal Audit;16 (v) that the Director of Federal Audit 
should, working on the strength of the statements made available to him 
by the Accountant – General and on his own independent investigation, 
inquire into and report annually, on the use of public funds, showing 
whether the rules of prudence and accountability had either been obeyed 
or breached;17 (vi) that responsible account/budget officer in every min-
istry should ensure that unspent balances in his ministry’s expenditure 
vote were returned to the federal treasury;18 and (vii) that the Governor 
or the Public Accounts Committee of the Nigerian legislature should act 
on the report of the Director of Federal Audit to apprehend cases of fraud 
or theft by bringing indicted officials to justice.19
The above prudential guidelines shall guide our subsequent analysis 
of the extent to which they were complied with by administrative bodies 
responsible for the management of Nigeria’s public finance in the colonial 
period. We should now turn to a discussion of each of the role and impact 
of the four administrative bodies established for the prudent use of 
resources in colonial Nigeria.
Office of the Governor
It was customary in those days of colonial rule for the Governor of 
Nigeria to prepare the annual budget with or without any input by the 
Nigerian Legislative Council and to send it to London for assessment 
and ratification. If it was ratified, then, it became law, that is the annual 
appropriation Act (budget) for the year indicated on it. This role of the 
Governor though exercised by him exclusively, was without prejudice to 
other very vital roles performed by other officials in other institutional 
structures for colonial finance such as the colonial Financial Secretary and 
15 See GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA, Finance (Control and Management) Act, 1958, in: 
Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, Chapter F26, Lagos 2004, section 6(1–3).
16 See GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA, Audit Ordinance, 1956, section 13(1 and 2), in: 
Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, Chapter 17, Lagos 1958.
17 Ibid., section 7(1 and 2).
18 Finance (Control and Management) Act, Lagos 1958, section 16.
19 Audit Ordinance, sections 9(3), 11, 14.
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the Accountant-General. The ultimate purposes being to ensure prudence 
in the use of public resources and, as far as colonial underlining principles 
for the use of public funds permitted, make public officials accountable to 
His Majesty’s government in England. We should return to this presently.
Suffice it to show here that apart from budget preparation and remit-
tance to London, the office of the Governor also had the responsibility 
of making sure that the books of Accounts presented to it were kept at 
a state of financial balance before auditing took place. As a result, the 
Governor always took the final decisions on what debt or irrecoverable 
loans and advances should be written-off or charged to the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund before auditing. This was to close any gap between actual 
and budgeted expenditure on the one hand and the actual and planned 
revenue on the other. Hence, from 1950 up to 1960, but particularly after 
the promulgation of the 1954 Oliver Lyttleton Constitution, the Gover-
nor of Nigeria wrote-off huge sums of money either as irrecoverable loans 
and advances or losses due to fraudulent encashment, forged vouchers 
and other sundry excuses in order to balance the accounts.20
Table 1 below shows the sums written off by the Governor in the 
respective years indicated due to some of the reasons mentioned above. 
It should be noted that these sums did not represent all the losses to 
government treasury and stores in those years but only a proportion 
of those losses that have been selected due to the significant amounts 
involved. However, the total amount written-off by the Governor from 
1951 to 1960 as shown in the table was £1,723,091–1s–1d.
Table 1: Losses to Government Accounts written off 




1951/52 2,291 15 6
1952/53 51,108 8 11
1953/54 16,551 5 6
1954/55 90,116 9 0
20 In the 1956/57 fiscal year for example, the sum of £53,196–12–9d was written-off by 
the Governor as irrecoverable loans and advances. See GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA, 
Report of the Accountant-General with Financial Statements for the Year Ended, 31st March 
1956, Lagos 1956, p. 99.
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1955/56 915,114 11 6
1956/57 612,122 4 6
1957/58 7,207 11 3
1958/59 7,462 8 0
1959/60 21,116 9 5
Total 1,723,091 1 1
Source: GoveRnment of nIGeRIa, Report of the Director of Audit on the Accounts 
of the Government of Nigeria for the years 1951–1960, Lagos 1960.
Office of the Financial Secretary
Although the ultimate accountability and prudential burden rested on 
the Governor’s office, but the office was not the only one saddled with 
the task of ensuring that public resources were prudently applied to 
productive purposes. The Financial Secretary’s Office was by far, the great-
est engine-room for drafting budget proposals and for aggregating and 
articulating the financial demands from all government departments. It, 
too, had great responsibility to enforce the rules of prudence on civil serv-
ants and to demand accountable behaviours from them. For example, the 
Financial secretary was empowered to write-off and, he actually wrote-off 
several times, huge sums of irrecoverable funds occasioned by theft, fraud, 
forged vouchers and loans and advances that were given to public officials 
who had either died without repaying the loans or absconded.21 It was the 
Financial Secretary that had the usual authority to issue warrants for the 
withdrawal of monies from the Consolidated Revenue Fund  and not the 
Governor.22 Except for the purposes of debt amortization, the Governor 
could not issue such warrants without the concurrence of the Financial 
Secretary.23 This was a built-in checks and balances measure designed to 
prevent the possibility of any one single colonial official from unilaterally 
dealing with public funds for whatever purpose howsoever reasonable.
In addition, it was the duty of the office of the Financial Secretary to 
receive, make comment thereon and transmit to the Director of Audit, the 
Report of the Accountant General of Nigeria Together with Financial Statements for 
21 See for example, GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA, Report of the Accountant-General with 
Financial Statements for the Year Ended, 31st March 1959, Lagos 1959, p. 212.
22 See GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA, Finance (Control and Management) Act, 1958, 
sections 3 and 6(1–2), in: Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, Chapter 144, Lagos 1990.
23 Ibid., section 6(3).
199
A. O. Ogunyemi, Administrative Structures for Accountability in Colonial Nigeria
every financial year.24 Nigeria’s financial year was a twelve-month period 
which, from 1914 until 1960 always began on the 1st day of April and 
ended on the 31st day of March of the following year.25 The comments 
made on such reports were of extreme importance  to the fulfilment of the 
prudential guidelines earlier mentioned. The statements must as a matter 
of law, always show the debt portfolio of Nigeria, the status of receipt into 
and disbursement from the Consolidated Revenue Fund.26 They must 
also reveal whether monies spent actually exceeded or was less or equal 
to approved amounts. And, as stated earlier, the financial comments of 
the Financial Secretary must reflect the different amounts written-off as 
losses to government and on whose authority they were either written-off 
or charged to the Consolidated Revenue Fund.27 Ample evidences reveal 
that the Financial Secretary, just like the Governor but before auditing, 
always wrote-off irrecoverable loans and advances and loss of petty cash in 
Ministries and Departments. For example and in the fiscal years 1954 /55, 
1956/57, 1958/58 and 1959/60, separate sums of £10,335–14s–7d,28 
£53,131–1s–3d,29 £46,548–9s–0d30 and £58,121–7s–6d,31 respectively, 
were written-off under the authority of the office Financial Secretary.
Office of the Accountant-General
Although the issuance of warrants authorising all expenditure activities 
belonged to the office of the Financial Secretary, the actual disbursement 
of funds in fulfilment of the directives of such warrants was entrusted to 
the office of the Accountant-General of Nigeria. Although the office was 
not dignified with any direct or express constitutional mentioning as 
24 See GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA, Audit Ordinance, 1956, in: Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria and Lagos, Chapter 17, Lagos 1958.
25 A. O. OGUNYEMI, Federal Budgets in Nigeria, 1954–1999: A History of the Processes, Policies 
and Problems, University of Lagos 2008, Ph.D. Thesis, p. 81.
26 Audit Ordinance, 1956, section 13(2)(a–d).
27 See GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA, Report of the Accountant-General with Financial State-
ments for the Year Ended, 31st March 1959, Lagos 1959, p. 212, statement No. 28.
28 See GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA, Report of the Accountant-General with Financial State-
ments for the Year Ended, 31st March 1955, Lagos 1955, p. 134.
29 See GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA, Report of the Accountant-General with Financial State-
ments for the Year Ended, 31st March 1959, Lagos 1957, p. 100.
30 See for example, GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA, Report of the Accountant-General with 
Financial Statements for the Year Ended, 31st March 1959, Lagos 1959, p. 212.
31 See GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA, Report of the Accountant-General with Financial State-
ments for the Year Ended, 31st March 1960, Lagos 1960, p. 110.
200
West Bohemian Historical Review IX | 2019 | 2
those of the Governor and the Financial Secretary in any of the constitu-
tions enacted for Nigeria from 1914 to 1960, but it was nonetheless an 
important office in the hierarchy of administrative structures and au-
thorities for the control of Nigeria’s finances. At any rate, it was specifically 
mentioned and roles allocated to it in the 1956 Audit Ordinance and in 
the Finance (Control and Management) Act of 1958. A clear evaluation of 
the functions of the Accountant-General’s office will show that in practical 
terms, it was a sort of financial gatekeeper for colonial Nigeria. The two 
laws and procedures on the fiscal administration of the country conferred 
on the occupier of the office, the duties of ensuring that all disbursements 
from the Consolidated Revenue Fund were strictly made in accordance 
with the appropriate expenditure warrants issued by the Financial 
Secretary and the expenditure vote contained in government budget.
In addition, after the creation of the Central Bank of Nigeria in 1958, 
it became a major duty of the Accountant-General to keep and maintain 
government revenues with the Bank and to report on the same to the 
Director of Audit. In effect, the Accountant-General was the manager 
of all the accounts of the government kept with the bank including ac-
counts in respect of endowments and special funds set up for all federal 
projects.32 The office was also imbued with the authority to apply and 
supervise compliance with government Financial Regulations and the 
Public Funds of the Federation (Disbursement) Rules.33
However, the Accountant General had no authority to disburse funds 
without prior written approvals. But he could, in good judgment, delay 
the release of funds if such a release would injure the rules of account-
ability enshrined in the Audit Act of 1956, namely when the disbursement 
would have the effect of paying for services or products which had not 
been included in an approved budget.34 Thus, when warrants were ad-
dressed to the Accountant-General, it was his duty to cross-check whether 
it was in furtherance of an approved expenditure vote or not otherwise, he 
could be held culpable of a breach of extant laws on fiscal accountability. 
Hence, the Accountant-General had the onerous responsibility not only 
to ensure that moneys were disposed of as approved but that they were 
applied to approved purposes contained in relevant appropriation Acts. 
32 GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA, Finance (Control and Management) Act, Lagos 1958, 
section 10(1)(2)(a-c).
33 These rules were made pursuant to the Finance (Control and Management) Act of 
1958.
34 Ibid., section 13(1).
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That was the reason why the law, especially the Audit Act imposed on the 
Accountant-General’s office, the duty of preparing statements of accounts 
of revenue and expenditure detailing total accrual to and disbursement 
from the Consolidated Revenue Fund.35 The office must do this within six 
months after the expiration of a financial year to which such statements 
referred.36 The statements were to be submitted to the Director of Audit, 
who would report on them accordingly.
Office of the Director of Audit
The office of the Director of Audit is today known as the office of the 
Auditor-General for the Federation of Nigeria.37 The change in nomen-
clature was effected under the 1979 constitution and affirmed under 
the extant 1999 constitution (as amended).38 The office of the Director 
of Audit for the colonial government of Nigeria was set up in 1922 as 
a department in the office of the Director-General of the British Overseas 
Audit Service.39 But the duties and the authority connected to it was not 
domesticated under Nigerian laws until 1956 when Nigeria had its first 
domestic legislation on public accounts auditing, that is, the Audit Ordi-
nance of 1956.40 By the provisions of the legislation, all public revenues 
and expenditure were directed to be reported on and be audited by the 
Director of Federal Audit. The Ordinance stipulated in clear terms, what 
the duties, functions and powers of the Director of Audit should be and 
the place of his office in the accountability framework for Nigeria’s federal 
finance. It stipulated: “The Director of Federal Audit shall on behalf of the House 
of Representatives inquire into and audit under general supervision of the Overseas 
Audit Service, the account of all accounting officers and of all persons entrusted with 
the collection, receipt, custody, issue or payment of federal public moneys, or with the 
receipt , custody, issue, sale, transfer or delivery of any stamps, securities, stores, or 
other property of the Government of the Federation: Provided that except where the 
provisions of section 8 apply, the Director of Audit shall only inquire into and audit 
35 GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA, Audit Ordinance, Lagos 1956, sections 13(1-2) and 
14(1).
36 Ibid., section 13.
37 GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, Lagos 
1999, section 85(1).
38 Compare this with the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979, Lagos 1979, 
section 79(1) and Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, section 85(1).
39 Audit Ordinance, 1956: section 2.
40 CHAPTER 17, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, 1958.
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the accounts of a Regional Officer so far as those accounts relate to the Federal Public 
moneys or other property of the Federation.” 41
Thus, the Audit Act conferred on the Director of Audit from 1956, the 
powers and functions of reporting on the provisions and use of public 
money and other assets of government by all account officers at the 
federal level. But the Director could not except when federal moneys 
especially in the form of grants-in-aid to the Regions were concerned, 
audit or report on the accounts of Regional Governments.42 His primary 
jurisdiction being limited to the federal level of governance. It is impor-
tant to state that the Audit Ordinance of 1956 is now referred to as the 
Audit Act, 1956 and has remained since the year of its enactment up till 
today as Nigeria’s only law on government auditing without any repeal, 
re-enactment or amendment whatsoever.
Impact of the Administrative Structures on the Duty to Ensure Pru-
dence and Accountability
Although it cannot be validly claimed that the level of official corruption 
due to imprudent use of public assets was on a scale that fundamentally 
derailed public expenditure plans, but there were clear cases of theft, 
fraudulent encashment of cheques and failure to report accurately on the 
use of public resources that the structures blatantly failed to arrest. Clear 
evidences from official records especially those of the Director of Federal 
Audit and the Accountant-General reveal huge cases of fraud and theft to 
include among others, cases of embarking on expenditure without recourse 
to warrants or even in default of appropriation,43 exceeding expenditure 
limits without approval,44 illegal virement of funds,45 non-retiring of un-
expended funds,46 destruction of or alleged disappearance of vouchers,47
41 Ibid., section 7(1).
42 Ibid.
43 See for example, GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA, Report of the Director of Federal Audit on 
the Accounts of the Government of the Federation of Nigeria for the Year Ended 31st March 1954, 
Lagos 1954, paragraph 41.
44 Huge cases of this are contained in the Report of the Director of Federal Audit on the Accounts 
of the Government of the Federation of Nigeria for the Year Ended 31st March 1959, Lagos 
1959, paragraph 112.
45 See Report of the Director of Federal Audit, 1956, paragraphs 40 and 45.
46 Ibid. It should be note however, that the legal basis for retiring unspent funds to trea-
sury was laid by section 16 of the Finance (Control and Management) Ordinance 1958.
47 See Reports of the Director Federal Audit, 1954 (paragraph 22) 1955 (paragraph 26) 
and 1956 (paragraph 46). See also, the GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERATION OF 
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utter disregard to extant rules on financial prudence48 and outright theft 
of public moneys.49 However, the most notable cases of failure by the su-
pervisory agencies to instil the rules of accountability in civil servants and 
arrest corruption were in the areas of public officials making expenditure 
either without due budgetary approval or in excess of it. They also failed 
to ensure that account officers adhered to extant rules on transmitting 
documentary evidences of purchases and payments made by them (the 
most important being receipt and payment vouchers), to the appropriate 
authorities for checking and validation. This transmission was the most 
important aspect of the prudential guidelines for reporting on the correct 
use and direction of government funds.
It is trite to say that the laws on the public finances of Nigeria under 
colonial rule forbade the application of funds to projects that were not 
expressly provided for in the budget. The most fundamental part of these 
laws was the provision in the 1954 Constitution on financial appropria-
tion which provided that: “No monies shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund or from other public funds of the Federation except on the authority 
of a warrant issued by the Governor-General or the Minister responsible for finance. 
No warrant should be issued for the purpose of meeting expenditure unless that 
expenditure had been authorised by a law enacted by the Federal legislature.”50
There was also the Finance (Control and Management) Act of 1958, 
which prohibited any expenditure which had not been backed by a min-
isterial warrant. But despite these laws, colonial officials still incurred 
expenditure in default or in excess of approved budgets. For instance, 
in the 1951/52, 1953/54, 1955/56 and 1957/58 fiscal years, senior 
civil servants and public officials spent without approval, the separate 
sums of £2,291–15s–6d,51 £118, 448–5s–0d,52 £915,114–11s–6d53 
NIGERIA, First Report from the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Representatives 
Session 1964/1965, National Archives Ibadan, File. No NA1/ NLI H4, pp. 10–14.
48 See Report of the Director of Federal Audit, 1958, paragraphs 89 and 113. 
49 Cases like this are replete in all the Reports filed by the Director of Federal Audit form 
1950–1960. See for example, the Report f the Director of Federal Audit, 1962, paragraphs 
13, 15 and 17 and Report of the Accountant-General of the Federation, Lagos 1956, pp. 6–14.
50 GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERATION OF NIGERIA, Nigeria Constitution (Order in 
Council) 1954, Lagos 1954, section 154(1–2).
51 GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA, Report of the Director of Federal Audit, 1952, paragraphs 
10–12.
52 GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA, Report of the Director of Federal Audit, 1954, paragraphs 8–17.
53 GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA, Report of the Director of Federal Audit, 1956, paragraphs 
10–33.
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and £7,207,356–0s–0d,54 respectively. In fact, it has been shown that 
Nigerian colonial authorities spent without any approvals a total of 
£26,174, 934–13s–2d, which accounted for 11.87% of the total capital 
expenditure of £178.1 million expended by the same authorities from 
1951 to 1960.55 This means that the supervisory authorities such as the 
Governor and the offices of the Accountant-General and that of the 
Director of Audit failed to prevent such huge financial irregularity which 
devalued the rules of prudence and accountability during the period.
Again, on the issue of the failure of the supervisory authorities to 
ensure prudence, many vouchers, such as payment vouchers, receipt 
and adjustment vouchers, by which government transactions and the 
use of funds could be traced and accounted for were either reported 
“missing”, destroyed or “disappeared”.56 No records either in those of 
the Accountant-General’s or in the Director of Audit’s office existed 
showing that officials who caused or negligently acted in a way that led 
to the disappearance of the vouchers were sanctioned. Huge numbers of 
vouchers were reported lost or missing in virtually all departments of the 
colonial government. In the 1953/54 fiscal year alone, 1,143 vouchers 
were reported “missing”57 while a year earlier (1952/53), a total of 1,596 
vouchers “disappeared” without a trace.58 This fact again signifies a major 
failure of the supervisory ministries to discourage the loss of financial 
records and to bring indicted officers to book.
However, many reasons accounted for the failure of the supervisory 
authorities especially the Accountant-General and the Director of Audit 
to checkmate the abuse of the financial process and to ensure that extant 
laws on fiscal prudence were enforced. The most significant reasons were: 
(i) failure to or dilatoriness in prosecuting indicted officials (ii) insuf-
ficient legal basis on which the anti-corruption structures could exert 
authority to prevent or sanction corrupt acts (iii) destruction of or failure 
to supply the required evidence that could be used to validly establish 
a case of corruption against officials accused of corruption and (iv) the 
relatively small amounts involved in cases of theft and fraud vis-à-vis the 
legal cost of securing conviction for such theft and fraud.
54 Report of the Director of Federal Audit, 1959, paragraphs 9–12.
55 OGUNYEMI, p. 434, table 7.1.
56 See for example, Report of the Director of Federal Audit, 1956, paragraph 37.
57 GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA, Report of the Director of Federal Audit, 1954, paragraph 24.
58 GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA, Report of the Director of Federal Audit, 1953, paragraph 40.
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Nigerian colonial authorities had a very unsalutary history of delays in 
sanctioning or prosecuting cases of theft of public funds and negligence 
occasioning loses to public assets. Therefore, very little (if any) lessons 
were learnt by public officials on the need to prudently apply public 
resources. Four instances will illustrate this point very vividly. First, in 
April 1950, a case of theft of petrol at the Public Works Department, 
Bamenda, occurred.59 It was dully reported. The petrol was estimated to 
be worth the sum of £104–8s–6d.60 But the matter was not brought to the 
notice of the Accountant-General by the storekeepers until September 
1951. However, due to further delays in apprehending and sanctioning 
the alleged thief, the culprit escaped.
A board of enquiry was constituted to investigate the matter and to 
make recommendations. The Board reported on the case in March 1952, 
recommending that an officer in the Public Works Department should be 
surcharged for the loss and for allowing the alleged thief to escape. The 
surcharge was not imposed until July 1953.61 The officer appealed against 
it in September 1954. When the matter was brought before the Financial 
Secretary for his administrative decision on the surcharge in 1954, the 
matter had delayed for almost three years. The Financial Secretary, who 
refused to allow the surcharge on the indicted officer considered that 
the matter had been allowed to delay for too long and that the justice of 
the matter required that such a delay annul any sanction that might be 
levied after it. Thus, he ordered that the surcharge be quashed because 
as he said: “[…] there were mitigating circumstances on several grounds, one of 
which was dilatoriness of the Public Works Department  in handling the case.”62 
In other words, a case of theft clearly established in 1950, dragged until 
1954 before a third-party (who ostensibly was not found guilty of the 
actual theft) could be recommend as a scope-goat for sanctioning when 
the actual thief was allowed to escape due to delays in apprehending him.
Second, there was also the case of a theft of the sum of £44–6s–6d at the 
Inland Revenue Office, Ebute-Metta by a staff of the office in November, 
1953.63 The matter was neither reported to the Accountant-General who 
should know of it, nor immediately to the police which had the duty to ar-
rest and arraign the accused for prosecution. The accused was not arrested 




63 Report of the Director of Federal Audit, 1955, paragraph 7.
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until 12th July 1955 and even after that, the charge against him was struck 
out on the 6th of July that year for want of evidence.64 A Board of Enquiry 
which should have investigated the matter and supplied the evidence was 
never set up by the Commissioner of Income Tax under whose jurisdiction 
the case fell. Subsequent attempts to re-arrest the accused failed, and the 
theft went without being redressed.
Third, there was a case of theft of government property established in 
audit in 1953. The theft was committed through a break into government 
quarters at Yaba, Lagos. It was a very common problem in the 1950s up 
to the time of independence in 1960, for unauthorised persons to break 
into government quarters stealing furniture.65 And, as it increasingly 
became clear that the decolonisation process was irreversible from the 
mid-1950s, the practice intensified. Several of such cases were reported on 
by the Director of Federal Audit in those years leading to independence. 
A particularly reprehensible case occurred in 1953 which the Director of 
Audit mentioned in his 1954 Audit Report because of the significance of 
the theft and the value of the properties involved which was more than 
£1,500. This case was neither investigated nor reported to the police 
despite the audit alarm raised.
Fourth and lastly, there was another interesting case of misappropria-
tion of a relatively smaller amount of money than shown in our preceding 
discussions. But the issue was not about the size of the sum involved but 
the utterly condemnable dilatoriness and perhaps attempts at covering 
up a glaring case of fraud committed by a government official. On the 
13th of October 1954, a  loss due to fraudulent embezzlement of the 
sum of £5–3s–6d occurred at the Massey street Dispensary (Medical 
Department), Lagos.66 A Board of Enquiry was not constituted to probe 
the fraud until January 1955. The report of the enquiry which clearly 
established a case of fraud against the culprit officer was not forwarded 
to the Accountant-General until August 1955.67 The report remained 
with the Accountant-General until January 1956 when it was finally 
forwarded to the Federal Public Service in April of the same year for its 
action. By that time, the fraud case had been delayed for a period of one 
and half years. “Justice delayed”, according to an established aphorism 
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., paragraph 14. The break-in involved 13 government quarters at Yaba, Lagos.
66 Report of the Director of Federal Audit, 1956, paragraph 17.
67 Ibid.
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in judicial practice, is “justice denied”. Thus, the chairman of the Federal 
Public Service Commission, declining to surcharge the amount to the 
indicted officer, blamed the offices of the Accountant-General and the 
Medical Department for the delay in doing justice to the matter for 
a period of 18 months. He said: “Some of the delays in this case are without 
explanation. I consider it essential that steps be taken to speed up these cases of losses 
of public funds and assets.” 68 Apart from objecting to the recommendation 
of the Board on surcharging the indicted officer on grounds of delay, the 
chairman also pointed at the small amount involved as a reason for his 
regarding the matter as trivial and should therefore be written-off at state 
expense. It was so done.
Another major cause of failures in enforcing the rules of accountability 
and prudence by the supervisory administrative institutions established 
for that purpose during colonial rule was the very insufficient or weak 
legal basis upon which their administrative powers were based. The 
Accountant-General of Nigeria, apart from being the person who had 
the authority to provide cash-backing to government expenditure was 
no more than a clerk of the Financial Secretary. Legal and administrative 
provisions only conferred huge responsibilities on him but failed to 
buttress these responsibilities with the right quantum of authority with 
which he could wield enough influence and power to supervise compli-
ance with the rules of accountability stipulated in the relevant laws. He 
only received warrants from the secretary but could not query or refuse 
to direct the issuance of money in fulfilment of the directives contained 
in the warrants. Thus, his functions were almost purely routine with little 
powers to sanction his officers for dereliction of duty or corruption. 
Although he could set up a board of enquiry to investigate infraction 
of the fiscal laws guiding proper accounting of government funds, he 
could not discipline any erring officer. That authority was conferred 
by law on the Federal Public Service Commission. In fact, the office of 
the Accountant-General enjoyed no constitutional mention let alone 
empowerment throughout the one-hundred years of colonial rule in 
Nigeria.69 Hence, the office, unlike those of the Governor-General or 
the Financial Secretary or even the Director of Audit only operated 
68 Ibid.
69 Even in the current Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the 
office of the Accountant-General of the Federation has no direct functions and powers 
allocated to it.
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based on subsidiary legislations or administrative orders issued by way 
of circulars.
The fact of insufficient legal foundations upon which some of the ad-
ministrative structures rested particularly the non-constitutional backing 
of the office of the Accountant-General greatly delimited the ability and 
the extent of authority that the office could wield. As a matter of fact, it 
was only at the concluding part of colonial rule in Nigeria and specifically 
in 1958, that a law tangentially recognising the office was enacted.70 Even 
at that, the law − the Finance (Control and Management) Act, 1958 – only 
referred to certain duties that the office of the Accountant-General should 
perform.71 It failed to confer on it the necessary and definite powers by 
which it could ensure discipline and accountability by all account officers 
who had the duty of managing the finances of Nigeria and who reported 
to him. The effect of this on the whole fabric of Nigeria’s accountability 
framework as enshrined in the 1954 constitution (as amended in 1958) 
was that the Accountant-General could not effectively bring to book any 
officer who defrauded government.
Again, even the Director of Audit whose office had been in existence 
since 1922, did not have any constitutional backing for his office or the 
duties assigned thereto until independence in 1960. Although a law was 
enacted in 1956 – the Audit Ordinance – by which the Director of Audit 
was conferred with the functions and powers to “inquire into and audit the 
accounts of all account officers and of all persons entrusted with the collection receipt, 
custody, issue or payment of Federal Public moneys”,72 and whereas the law 
empowered him to “call on any Federal or Regional Officer to furnish forthwith 
any explanations or information which he may require to enable him to discharge 
his duties”,73 the same law delimited these powers in many other respects 
that had the effect of stopping the Director of Audit from enforcing the 
rules of accountability. At any rate, it baffles one why colonial authorities 
had to wait until the concluding part of their rule before such an impor-
tant administrative structure for accountability could be legislated into 
existence.
70 This was the Finance (Control and Management) Ordinance (now designated as Act 
of the National Assembly). See CHAPTER F26 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.
71 Such as managing the “investment general” of Nigeria. See Finance (Control and 
Management) Ordinance, 1958, section 12(1 and 2).
72 Audit Ordinance, 1956, section 7(1).
73 Ibid., section 12.
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However, although the Director of Audit had the legal basis to probe 
and report on any infraction of the fiscal laws of the country beginning 
in 1956, he had no power to either surcharge any unjustifiable loss or 
reprimand or sanction any fraudulent official for failing to follow laid-
down prudential guidelines. That is, whereas the law imposed the duty 
to investigate any officer of government on the use of public moneys, 
it however failed to grant him special prosecutorial powers or at least, 
the power to sanction by way of a surcharge any officer who brought 
unjustifiable loss to government treasury by his conduct. Second, the law 
also failed to protect the Director of Audit from possible victimisation or 
harassment by those he was required by law to investigate. For example, 
the law failed to secure his tenure of office, because his appointment was 
held at the pleasure of the Governor who could determine it at anytime.74
In addition, although the Director of Audit had the duty to submit his 
report to the Nigerian Parliament under the law, the law failed to show 
or provide any time-frame within which the recommendations contained 
therein should be acted upon and the type of punishment that should be 
levied on any official found culpable of corrupt acts. Finally, whereas the 
Audit Ordinance provided that reports of irregularities discovered in the 
application of public resources should be made either to the Governor-
General or the Minister responsible for finance,75 it fails to show or resolve 
the contradiction as to what happens when the irregularities was com-
mitted by either the same Governor or the Minister of finance. Because 
this would mean that either the Governor of the Minister would have the 
duty and power to preside over their own cases. A condition that is utterly 
abhorrent to the principles of fairness, justice and equity. The total of the 
effects of all these legal deficiencies in the Audit Ordinance of 1956 was 
that the Director of Audit never really had the powers to arrest, sanction 
or even bring to justice any account officer discovered to have corruptly 
or negligently dealt with public resources.
Another major reason why the administrative structures failed to block 
many corrupt acts from being committed on government accounts was 
the destruction or “disappearance” of vital statutory records that could 
be used as evidences in prosecuting corrupt or negligent officials and 
thereby dissuading any further misuse of power and corrupt behaviours. 
These records included the Annual Financial Statements of Nigeria, which 
74 Ibid., section 4(1).
75 Ibid., section 9(3).
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the law compelled the Accountant-General to prepare on the financial 
transactions of Nigeria detailing statements of revenue, expenditure, debt 
payments, assets and liabilities. Other records included those dealing 
with the direct purchases of and receipts by government in the form of 
payment vouchers, receipt vouchers and so forth.
Many cases were established in audit that these vital records, without 
which no corrupt acts could be validly detected or proved in the court of 
law, were either not transmitted as at when due or were reported to have 
“disappeared” or “missing”. A very good example was the proven case of 
the financial reports for the fiscal years 1951/52,1952/53 and 1953/54 
which, as at the 31st of March 1954, had not been transmitted by the 
Accountant-General to the Director of Federal Audit for perusal and 
investigation.76 The Director of Audit who had no power under the Audit 
Ordinance or the Finance (Control and Management) Act to compel 
the Accountant-General to submit the reports to him only contented 
himself with complaining bitterly of this dereliction of duty in his 1954 
Audit Report.77 We have already shown how such delays could and did 
frustrate the attempts at bringing to justice any corrupt behaviour and 
their perpetrators. But nowhere in the laws cited above was the refusal by 
the Accountant-General to submit financial statements made punishable. 
This loophole was exploited by the Accountant-General to the fullest 
throughout the period under review.
With regards to the failure to keep and on demand, present other 
official records (such as vouchers) evidencing government financial 
transactions apart from the annual financial statements referred to above, 
the office of the Accountant-General also failed woefully to follow the 
due process of public accountability. Thousands of payment, receipt and 
adjustment vouchers were reported as either “missing or “disappeared” 
by the office and several other departments of government without any 
justification whatsoever.78 With “disappeared” vouchers, the Director 
of Audit could really not properly establish in audit the actual cause(s), 
source(s) and the person(s) responsible for either the misuse or theft of 
most of government assets especially cash. But the loss or disappearance 
of vouchers continued for many years with grave consequences for 
76 Report of the Director of Federal Audit, 1954, paragraph 7.
77 See for example Reports of the Director of Federal Audit, 1954 (paragraphs 7 and 14), 1956 
(paragraphs 7 and 8) and 1959 (paragraph 6).
78 Report of the Director of Federal Audit, 1955, paragraph 27.
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government financial assets. For example, and as shown in table 2 below, 
between the years 1940–1952, a total of 13,019 vouchers of different 
types were reported missing and could not be traced.79 The vouchers 
concerned the payment of a total of £89,015 by government which could 
not be satisfactorily established in audit during the period.
Again and specifically in the fiscal years 1952/53, 1953/54 and 1954/55, 
separate sums amounts of vouchers that were reported “disappeared” as 
shown in table 2 below were: 1,596, 1,143 and 468, respectively, or a total 
of 3,207 disappeared vouchers in those three fiscal years. Although  the 
number of vouchers that were reported missing without a single trace in 
1955/56 was considerably less than one-thirds of those reported missing 
in the 1952/53 fiscal year, but even at that, to declare that 527 payment 
vouchers could not be found in the former fiscal year was still sufficiently 
serious enough to derail accurate financial reporting. Such cases of miss-
ing financial records also required that government set up a committee/
panel to probe the issues of missing vouchers. Although the government 
considered it apt to constitute such a panel in 1955 when cases of missing 
vouchers had reached an alarming level especially when some vouchers 
concerning the accounts of the Colonial Welfare and Development 
Scheme, involving the sum of £32,000 were reported missing, it never 
really did until independence was achieved in 1960.80 The colonial gov-
ernment just simply refused to constitute the right panel to investigate 
why those sensitive government financial records could be said to have 
“disappeared” and who ought to be responsible for their safe-keeping  In 
fact, in his 1956 annual report, the Director of Federal Audit, Mr J. W. H. 
Allen had cause to remind the government of its duty to accountable 
governance when he urged it to urgently constitute a committee/panel to 
probe the issue of missing vouchers. Mr. Allen had written: “The committee 
to consider the question of outstanding vouchers has still not been appointed. The 
matter was further discussed at the Public Accounts Committee in 1956, and it was 
agreed that the committee should be set up in the near future. There are still large 
numbers of vouchers outstanding from previous years which searches have failed 
to produce. The matter has now reached stalemate owing to the delay in convening 
the committee. One most important aspect of this problem is the question of miss-
ing payment vouchers for colonial Development and Welfare expenditure […] 
unvouched payments charged to Colonial Development and Welfare Schemes total 
79 Report of the Director of Federal Audit, 1954, paragraph 19.
80 Report of the Director of Audit, 1956, paragraph 37.
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about £32,000. It is possible that if these vouchers are not produced, the Secretary 
of State will disallow the reimbursable part of this sum […].”81
Table 2: Missing Vouchers, 1940–1959










Source: GoveRnment of nIGeRIa, Report of the Director of Federal Audit on the Accounts 
of the Government of Nigeria for the Years 1954−1959, Lagos (various Years).
In all, a total of 19,864 vouchers were declared missing and could not 
be produced even after several searches of government safes from 1940 
to 1959.
However, the Director of Audit was able to link the issue of missing 
vouchers to an illegal practice by bureaucrats and senior colonial officials 
of flagrantly flouting the law tying all government expenditure to an 
approved budget and specific warrant. The extant law on this (section 
154 of the 1954 Constitution cited earlier), forbade any civil or public 
servant from embarking on expenditure without the appropriate warrant 
sought and obtained from either the Minister of Finance or the Governor 
of Nigeria.82 Apart from the fact that they exceeded their expenditure 
votes routinely, the Director of Audit found that they also succeeded in 
spending monies on projects that had not been approved at all in utter 
disregard of the same section 154 of the 1954 constitution. It was also 
reported that they hid the vouchers in respect of such transactions. In 
the 1958/59 fiscal year alone, a total of £5,793,815−6s−2d was spent 
81 Report of the Director of Federal Audit, 1956, paragraphs 36 and 37.
82 It was mandatory under section 6(1 and 2) of the Finance (Control and Management) 
Ordinance of 1958 for warrants to be obtained from the Minister responsible for 
finance before any expenditure was made.
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in this way without warrant either from the Minister of Finance or the 
Governor.83
Table 3 below shows the departmental and sectoral distribution of 
such illegal expenditure and the Heads of expenditure to which they 
specifically related. The table also shows that Federal expenditure 
which consumed the highest unapproved and non-warranted amount 
of £2,253,427−05−10d was the Development Fund Account.84 That 
amount was used in financing government capital project of which the 
Colonial Welfare and Development Schemes constituted a major propor-
tion. However, the highest amount of non-warranted expenditure of 
£2,795,807−6s−9d which was not expenditure on any federal project was 
made up statutory transfers to Regional Governments in the same year. 
The least amount of non-warranted expenditure of £4,490−16s−8d was 
spent on the Medical Services Department. All these evidences of unap-
proved expenditure point to a failure to stick to extant rules on financial 
prudence during colonial rule. They also show the extent to which the 
administrative structures and supervisory authorities on government fi-
nances failed to ensure accountability in the use of government resources.
Table 3: Monies Spent Without Warrant (1958/59 Fiscal Year)
S/N Head of Expenditure Ministry/Department Amount (£)
1 34 Education 8,590−6s−6d
2 38 Finance 24,397−9s−0d
3 42 Statistics 5,661−7s−6d
4 46 Medical 4,490−16s−8d
5 81 Miscellaneous 701,440−18s−11d
6 82 Development Fund 2,253,427−0s−10d
7 83 Statutory appropriation to Regional Governments 2,795,807,6s−9d
Total 5,793,815–6s−2d
Source: GoveRnment of nIGeRIa, Report of the Director of Federal Audit on the Accounts 
of the Federation of Nigeria for the Year ended 31st March, 1959, appendix II, p. 24.
83 Report of the Director of Federal Audit, 1959, p. 24, appendix II.
84 The Development Fund Account was created for Nigeria on 1st April 1956. The account 
on that date, established for the first time in Nigeria’s financial history, a specific capi-
tal projects fund from which the capital side of the federal budget could be financed.
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Summary and Conclusions
The government of Colonial Nigeria did not fail to create veritable 
administrative and supervisory authorities for the prudential manage-
ment of public resources. The authorities were required to enforce certain 
prudential guidelines for the prevention of corruption and the avoidance 
of financial losses. But the administrative structures, chief among which 
were the offices of the Governor-General, Financial Secretary, as well as 
those of the Accountant-General and the Director of Federal Audit were 
grossly ineffective in ensuring that civil or public servants obeyed their 
prudential guidelines in many respects and that they were accountable 
in the use of public resources. Many of the departments of government 
refused to comply strictly with extant rules on the remittances of appropri-
ate financial transcripts and other documentary evidence such as payment 
vouchers through which non-accountable conducts could be traced and 
sanctioned. Apart from this, even the laws that were made to compel 
probity and financial prudence were by far too few and came too late to 
serve any useful purposes in effectively arresting and punishing fraud.
Even when the only two laws on the fiscal management of Nigeria were 
enacted in 1956 and 1958, colonial government had, in fact, begun to 
conclude its rule in Nigeria and since the laws had no retroactive effect, 
fraudulent acts committed before  their enactment could not be brought 
to justice. Thus, whereas the Director of Audit complained vociferously 
about several non-accountable acts occasioning theft and fraud, very 
little was done by the supervisory authorities to bring the indicted of-
ficers to book. Although it was true that many of the incidences of theft 
and fraud involved small amounts of cash and stores of negligible value, 
but it would have served the cause of justice better if some of those acts, 
regardless of the cost of prosecution, were brought to justice to dissuade 
further theft and fraud. But it should be stated that even if the supervisory 
authorities had attempted to sanction every infringement of the laws 
on prudence, the fact that those laws particularly the Audit Ordinance 
of 1956 and the Finance (Control and Management) Ordinance of 
1958 had no sufficient punitive  measures to punish offenders further 
contributed to a culture of dilatoriness in bringing culprits to book. Thus, 
the authorities, especially the offices of the Governor-General and the 
Accountant-General merely resorted to writing-off losses to government 
due by theft and fraud particularly when the records that could be used to 
apprehend culprits were routinely declared “missing” or “disappeared”.
